Daily Papers

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer).

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Extrinsic rewards can effectively guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents in specific tasks. However, extrinsic rewards frequently fall short in complex environments due to the significant human effort needed for their design and annotation. This limitation underscores the necessity for intrinsic rewards, which offer auxiliary and dense signals and can enable agents to learn in an unsupervised manner. Although various intrinsic reward formulations have been proposed, their implementation and optimization details are insufficiently explored and lack standardization, thereby hindering research progress. To address this gap, we introduce RLeXplore, a unified, highly modularized, and plug-and-play framework offering reliable implementations of eight state-of-the-art intrinsic reward methods. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth study that identifies critical implementation details and establishes well-justified standard practices in intrinsically-motivated RL. Our documentation, examples, and source code are available at https://github.com/RLE-Foundation/RLeXplore.

Reward models are critical for aligning models to follow instructions, and are typically trained following one of two popular paradigms: Bradley-Terry style or Regression style. However, there is a lack of evidence that either approach is better than the other, when adequately matched for data. This is primarily because these approaches require data collected in different (but incompatible) formats, meaning that adequately matched data is not available in existing public datasets. To tackle this problem, we release preference annotations (designed for Bradley-Terry training) to complement existing ratings (designed for Regression style training) in the HelpSteer2 dataset. To improve data interpretability, preference annotations are accompanied with human-written justifications. Using this data, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of Bradley-Terry and Regression models when adequately matched for data. Based on insights derived from such a comparison, we propose a novel approach to combine Bradley-Terry and Regression reward modeling. A Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct model tuned with this approach scores 94.1 on RewardBench, emerging top of more than 140 reward models as of 1 Oct 2024. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this reward model at aligning models to follow instructions in RLHF. We open-source this dataset (CC-BY-4.0 license) at https://huggingface.co/datasets/nvidia/HelpSteer2 and openly release the trained Reward Model at https://huggingface.co/nvidia/Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Reward

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

We propose CURE, a novel reinforcement learning framework with a dedicated reward design that co-evolves coding and unit test generation capabilities based on their interaction outcomes, without any ground-truth code as supervision. This approach enables flexible and scalable training and allows the unit tester to learn directly from the coder's mistakes. Our derived ReasonFlux-Coder-7B and 14B models improve code generation accuracy by 5.3% and Best-of-N accuracy by 9.0% after optimization on Qwen2.5-Instruct models, outperforming similarly sized Qwen-Coder, DeepSeek-Coder, and Seed-Coder. They naturally extend to downstream tasks such as test-time scaling and agentic coding-achieving a 8.1% improvement over the base model. For the long-CoT model, our ReasonFlux-Coder-4B consistently outperforms Qwen3-4B while achieving 64.8% inference efficiency in unit test generation. Notably, we also find that our model can serve as an effective reward model for reinforcement learning on base models. Project: https://github.com/Gen-Verse/CURE

Large language models~(LLMs) are expected to be helpful, harmless, and honest. In alignment scenarios such as safety, confidence, and general preference alignment, binary preference data collection and reward modeling are resource-intensive but essential for transferring human preference. In this work, we explore using the similarity between sampled generations and high-quality reference answers as an alternative reward function choice for LLM alignment. Similarity reward circumvents binary preference data collection and reward modeling when unary high-quality reference answers are available. We introduce RefAlign, a versatile REINFORCE-style alignment algorithm that does not rely on reference or reward models. RefAlign utilizes similarity metrics, such as BERTScore between sampled generations and reference answers as surrogate rewards. Beyond general human preference optimization, RefAlign can be readily extended to diverse scenarios, such as safety and confidence alignment, by incorporating the similarity reward with task-related objectives. In various scenarios, RefAlign demonstrates comparable performance to previous alignment methods without binary preference data and reward models.

Reward models (RMs) are crucial for the training and inference-time scaling up of large language models (LLMs). However, existing reward models primarily focus on human preferences, neglecting verifiable correctness signals which have shown strong potential in training LLMs. In this paper, we propose agentic reward modeling, a reward system that combines reward models with verifiable correctness signals from different aspects to provide reliable rewards. We empirically implement a reward agent, named RewardAgent, that combines human preference rewards with two verifiable signals: factuality and instruction following, to provide more reliable rewards. We conduct comprehensive experiments on existing reward model benchmarks and inference time best-of-n searches on real-world downstream tasks. RewardAgent significantly outperforms vanilla reward models, demonstrating its effectiveness. We further construct training preference pairs using RewardAgent and train an LLM with the DPO objective, achieving superior performance on various NLP benchmarks compared to conventional reward models. Our codes are publicly released to facilitate further research (https://github.com/THU-KEG/Agentic-Reward-Modeling).

Learning compatible representations enables the interchangeable use of semantic features as models are updated over time. This is particularly relevant in search and retrieval systems where it is crucial to avoid reprocessing of the gallery images with the updated model. While recent research has shown promising empirical evidence, there is still a lack of comprehensive theoretical understanding about learning compatible representations. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stationary representations learned by the d-Simplex fixed classifier optimally approximate compatibility representation according to the two inequality constraints of its formal definition. This not only establishes a solid foundation for future works in this line of research but also presents implications that can be exploited in practical learning scenarios. An exemplary application is the now-standard practice of downloading and fine-tuning new pre-trained models. Specifically, we show the strengths and critical issues of stationary representations in the case in which a model undergoing sequential fine-tuning is asynchronously replaced by downloading a better-performing model pre-trained elsewhere. Such a representation enables seamless delivery of retrieval service (i.e., no reprocessing of gallery images) and offers improved performance without operational disruptions during model replacement. Code available at: https://github.com/miccunifi/iamcl2r.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Aligning multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with human preferences often relies on single-signal, model-based reward methods. Such monolithic rewards often lack confidence calibration across domain-specific tasks, fail to capture diverse aspects of human preferences, and require extensive data annotation and reward model training. In this work, we propose a hybrid reward modeling framework that integrates complementary reward paradigms: (i) model-based rewards, where a learned reward model predicts scalar or vector scores from synthetic and human feedback, and (ii) rule-based rewards, where domain-specific heuristics provide explicit correctness signals with confidence. Beyond accuracy, we further incorporate multi-aspect rewards to enforce instruction adherence and introduce a generalized length-penalty reward to stabilize training and improve performance. The proposed framework provides a flexible and effective approach to aligning MLLMs through reinforcement learning policy optimization. Our experiments show consistent improvements across different multimodal benchmarks when applying hybrid and multi-aspect reward modeling. Our best performing model in the 3B family achieves an overall average improvement of ~9.5% across general and math reasoning tasks. Focusing specifically on mathematical benchmarks, the model achieves a significant average improvement of ~16%, highlighting its effectiveness in mathematical reasoning and problem solving.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) with reward models has advanced alignment of generative models to human aesthetic and perceptual preferences. However, jointly optimizing multiple rewards often incurs an alignment tax, improving one dimension while degrading others. To address this, we introduce two complementary methods: MapReduce LoRA and Reward-aware Token Embedding (RaTE). MapReduce LoRA trains preference-specific LoRA experts in parallel and iteratively merges them to refine a shared base model; RaTE learns reward-specific token embeddings that compose at inference for flexible preference control. Experiments on Text-to-Image generation (Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium and FLUX.1-dev) show improvements of 36.1%, 4.6%, and 55.7%, and 32.7%, 4.3%, and 67.1% on GenEval, PickScore, and OCR, respectively. On Text-to-Video generation (HunyuanVideo), visual and motion quality improve by 48.1% and 90.0%, respectively. On the language task, Helpful Assistant, with Llama-2 7B, helpful and harmless improve by 43.4% and 136.7%, respectively. Our framework sets a new state-of-the-art multi-preference alignment recipe across modalities.

Reward finetuning has emerged as a promising approach to aligning foundation models with downstream objectives. Remarkable success has been achieved in the language domain by using reinforcement learning (RL) to maximize rewards that reflect human preference. However, in the vision domain, existing RL-based reward finetuning methods are limited by their instability in large-scale training, rendering them incapable of generalizing to complex, unseen prompts. In this paper, we propose Proximal Reward Difference Prediction (PRDP), enabling stable black-box reward finetuning for diffusion models for the first time on large-scale prompt datasets with over 100K prompts. Our key innovation is the Reward Difference Prediction (RDP) objective that has the same optimal solution as the RL objective while enjoying better training stability. Specifically, the RDP objective is a supervised regression objective that tasks the diffusion model with predicting the reward difference of generated image pairs from their denoising trajectories. We theoretically prove that the diffusion model that obtains perfect reward difference prediction is exactly the maximizer of the RL objective. We further develop an online algorithm with proximal updates to stably optimize the RDP objective. In experiments, we demonstrate that PRDP can match the reward maximization ability of well-established RL-based methods in small-scale training. Furthermore, through large-scale training on text prompts from the Human Preference Dataset v2 and the Pick-a-Pic v1 dataset, PRDP achieves superior generation quality on a diverse set of complex, unseen prompts whereas RL-based methods completely fail.

In this paper, we propose DuaShepherd, a novel reward modeling framework that integrates two complementary reward signals, correctness and potential, to enhance the mathematical reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While correctness-based signals emphasize identification of stepwise errors, potential-based signals focus on the likelihood of reaching the correct final answer. We developed an automated pipeline for constructing large-scale reward modeling dataset with both signals. A unified, multi-head architecture was explored to train the two reward models in a multi-task setup, demonstrating benefits from learning both correctness and potential in parallel. By combining these two signals into a compound probability, our model achieves consistent performance improvements across multiple benchmarks. Empirical evaluations on MATH500 and ProcessBench confirm that this combined reward significantly outperforms models trained on either reward type alone, achieving state-of-the-art performance under comparable resource constraints.

The integration of large language models (LLMs) into education presents unprecedented opportunities for scalable personalized learning. However, standard LLMs often function as generic information providers, lacking alignment with fundamental pedagogical principles such as helpfulness, student-centered personalization, and creativity cultivation. To bridge this gap, we propose EduAlign, a novel framework designed to guide LLMs toward becoming more effective and responsible educational assistants. EduAlign consists of two main stages. In the first stage, we curate a dataset of 8k educational interactions and annotate them-both manually and automatically-along three key educational dimensions: Helpfulness, Personalization, and Creativity (HPC). These annotations are used to train HPC-RM, a multi-dimensional reward model capable of accurately scoring LLM outputs according to these educational principles. We further evaluate the consistency and reliability of this reward model. In the second stage, we leverage HPC-RM as a reward signal to fine-tune a pre-trained LLM using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on a set of 2k diverse prompts. We then assess the pre- and post-finetuning models on both educational and general-domain benchmarks across the three HPC dimensions. Experimental results demonstrate that the fine-tuned model exhibits significantly improved alignment with pedagogical helpfulness, personalization, and creativity stimulation. This study presents a scalable and effective approach to aligning LLMs with nuanced and desirable educational traits, paving the way for the development of more engaging, pedagogically aligned AI tutors.