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# Locality and measurements within the SR model for an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics

## 1. INTRODUCTION

One of us has recently proposed an SR model which provides an interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) that is objective.(1) Intuitively, objectivity means here that any measurement of a physical property of an individual sample of a given physical system reveals a preexisting value of the measured property, that does not depend on the measurements that are carried out on the sample.111More rigorously, objectivity can be intended as a purely semantic notion, as follows. Any physical theory is stated by means of a general language which contains a theoretical language LT and an observative language LO. The former constitutes the formal apparatus of the theory and contains terms denoting theoretical entities (as probability amplitudes, electromagnetic fields, etc.). The latter is linked to LT by means of correspondence rules that provide an indirect and partial interpretation of LT on LO. Furthermore, LO is interpreted by means of assignment rules which make some symbols of LO correspond to macroscopic entities (as preparing and measuring devices, outcomes, etc.), so that the elementary sentences of LO are verifiable, or testable, since they state verifiable properties of individual objects of the kind considered by the theory (note that this does not imply that also the molecular sentences of LO are testable). On the basis of these assigments, a truth theory is (often implicitly) adopted that defines truth values for some or all sentences of LO. Then, we say that physical properties are objective in the given theory if the truth values of all elementary sentences of LO are defined independently of the actual determination of them that may be done by an observer (for instance, the correspondence theory of truth reaches this goal by means of a set-theoretical model; by the way, we note that this truth theory entails only a form of observative, or macroscopic, realism, even if it is compatible with more demanding forms of realism).

The SR model is inspired by a series of more general papers aiming to supply an SR interpretation of QM that is realistic in a semantic sense, in the framework of an epistemological position called Semantic Realism (briefly, SR; see, e.g., Refs. 2-5): indeed, it shows how an SR interpretation can be consistently constructed. However, the SR model is presented in Ref. 1 by using only the standard language of QM, in order to make it understandable even to physicists that are not interested in the conceptual subtelties of the general theory. But the treatment in Ref. 1 does not deal explicitly with the special case of compound physical systems, hence neither the measurement problem nor the locality/nonlocality problem are considered, even though the locality of the interpretation of QM provided by the SR model is anticipated. Therefore, we intend to discuss briefly these topics in the present paper.

Our analysis begins with some preliminaries. We discuss in Sec. 2 the concept of physical property from a logical viewpoint, stress that properties having different logical orders correspond to different kinds of experimental procedures, and note that the properties represented by projection operators in standard QM or in the SR model are first order properties only; we also point out that, even if every state S of the physical system can be associated with a first order property (the support FS of S), recognizing an unknown state requires experimental procedures corresponding to higher order properties, which is relevant to the treatment of the measurement problem, as we show in Sec. 6. Furthermore, we briefly analyze in Sec. 3 some typical proofs of nonlocality of standard QM and individuate in them a common general scheme, notwithstanding their differences.

Bearing in mind the above preliminaries, we deal with the locality problem from the viewpoint of the SR model in Sec. 4. We provide firstly a slightly simplified version of the model, and then note that the objective interpretation of QM provided by it supplies an intuitive local picture of the physical world and avoids a number of paradoxes, since objectivity implies locality. But this entails that the arguments examined in Sec. 3 must fail to hold, otherwise one would get a contradiction. Thus, we dedicate the rest of Sec. 4 to show that the proofs of nonlocality in Sec. 3 are actually invalid within the SR model, so that no inconsistency occurs. As a byproduct of our analysis, we get that Bell’s inequalities do not provide a test for distinguishing local realistic theories from QM.

We then come to quantum measurements and observe in Sec. 5 that the SR model avoids the main problem of standard quantum measurement theory, i.e., the objectification problem; we also note that measurements still play a nonclassical role according to the SR model, since choosing a specific measurement establishes which properties can be known and which remain unknown, but point out some relevant differences between this perspective and the standard QM viewpoint. Moreover, we show in Sec. 6 that the further problem of double (unitary/stochastic) evolution of quantum measurement theory disappears within the SR model, since stochastic evolution can be considered as an approximate law that is valid for all practical purposes; we also discuss some consequences of the projection postulate that illustrate further the differences existing between the interpretation of the measuring process according to the SR model and the standard interpretation.

Finally, we provide in Sec. 7 an intuitive picture that justifies some relevant features of the SR model and proves its consistency by modifying the extended SR model(1) in which microscopic properties are introduced as theoretical entities.

## 2. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, STATES AND SUPPORTS

Consider the following sets of statements in the standard language of physics.

(i) “The energy of the system falls in the interval \[a,b\]”.

“The system has energy $``$ and momentum $`\stackrel{}{p}`$ at time t”.

(ii) “The energy of the system falls in the interval \[a,b\] with frequency f whenever the system is in the state S”.

“If the system has energy $``$, then its momentum is $`\stackrel{}{p}`$ with frequency f”.

(iii) “The energy of the system falls in the interval \[a,b\] with a frequency that is maximal in the state S”.

“If the system has energy $``$, then its momentum is $`\stackrel{}{p}`$ with a frequency that is maximal whenever the system is in the state S”.

All these statements express, in some sense, “physical properties” of a physical system. But these properties have not the same logical status, correspond to conceptually different experimental apparatuses, and a careful analysis of their differences is useful if one wants to discuss the objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model in the case of compound physical systems. Therefore, let us preliminarily observe that the word system in the above statements actually means individual sample of a given physical system, or physical object according to the terminology introduced in the SR model (indeed the term physical system is commonly used in the standard language of physics for denoting both classes of physical objects and individual samples, leaving to the context the charge of making clear the specific meaning that is adopted). Then, let us note that the first statement in (i) assigns the property

F=having energy that falls in the interval \[a,b\]

to a physical object, while the second statement assigns the properties

E=having energy $``$ at time t,

P=having momentum $`\stackrel{}{p}`$ at time t.

The properties F, E, P are first order properties from a logical viewpoint, since they apply to individual samples, and each of them can be tested (in a given laboratory) by means of a single measurement performed by a suitable ideal dichotomic registering device having outcomes 0 and 1 (of course, E and P can be tested conjointly only if they are commeasurable).

Let us come to the statements in (ii). These assign second order properties to ensembles of physical objects. To be precise, in the first statement one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property F and the ensemble of objects that are in the state S, and the second order property regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must be such that its ratio with the number of the objects in S is f. Analogously, in the second statement one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property E and the ensemble of objects that possess the property P, and the second order property regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must by such that its ratio with the number of objects that possess the property E is f. The first of these properties can be tested by producing a given number of physical objects in the state S, performing measurements of the first order property F on its elements, counting the objects that have the property F, and then calculating a relative frequency. The second property can be tested by means of analogous procedures (which require measurements of first order properties on a number of objects) if E and P are commeasurable, while there is no procedure testing it in standard QM if E and P are not commeasurable.

Finally, the statements in (iii) assign third order properties to sets of ensembles. The property in the first statement can be tested (in a given laboratory) by producing sets of ensembles, performing measurements of first order properties on all elements of each ensemble, calculating frequencies, and finally comparing the obtained results. The property in the second statement requires analogous procedures, which may exist or not, depending on the commeasurability of E and P.

It is now apparent that one could take into account further statements containing properties of still higher order. Our discussion however is sufficient to prove the main point here: properties of different logical orders appear in the common language of physics, and properties that are different when looked at from this logical viewpoint are also different from a physical viewpoint. Of course, nothing prohibits that a first order property F be attributed to some or all elements of an ensemble of physical objects: but first order properties must be distinguished from higher order properties, and, in particular, from correlation properties, which usually are second order properties that establish relations among first order properties (the example above shows that the measurement of a property of this kind requires the comparison of sets of results obtained by measuring first order properties). We shall see that this distinction is relevant when dealing with the measurement problem in Sec. 6.

From a mathematical viewpoint, only first order properties are represented directly within standard QM. To be precise, let ($``$($``$),$``$) be the lattice of all orthogonal projection operators on the Hilbert space $``$ of a physical system, and let $``$ be the set of all first order properties of the system. According to standard QM, every element of ($``$($``$),$``$) represents bijectively (in absence of superselection rules) an element of $``$. For the sake of brevity, we call any element of $``$ physical property, or simply property, in the following, omitting the reference to the logical order.

The set $``$ can be endowed with the partial order induced on it by the mathematical order $``$ defined on $``$($``$) (that we still denote by $``$), and the lattice ($``$,$``$) is usually called the lattice of properties of the system. It follows that every pure state S can be associated with a minimal property F$`{}_{S}{}^{}`$ that is often called the support of S in the literature (see, e.g., Ref. 6). To be precise, if S is represented in $``$ by the vector $`\phi `$, FS is the property represented by the one-dimensional projection operator Pφ = $`\phi \phi `$, which obviously is such that Pφ $``$ P for every P $``$($``$) such that $``$P$`\phi ^2`$= 1. It is then apparent that FS can be characterized as the property that is possessed by a physical object x with certainty (i.e., with probability 1) iff x is in the state S. Indeed, for every vector $`\phi ^{}`$ representing a pure state S, one gets $``$P$`{}_{\phi }{}^{}\phi ^{}^2`$= 1 iff $`\phi ^{}`$ = $`e^{i\theta }\phi `$, hence iff S = S.

The existence of a support for every pure state of a physical system is linked with the problem of distinguishing different pure states, or pure states from mixtures, in standard QM. Indeed, there is no way in this theory for recognizing experimentally the state S of a single physical object x whenever this state is not known (for the sake of brevity, we assume here that S is a pure state): even if one measures on x an observable $`𝒜`$ that has S as an eigenstate corresponding to a nondegenerate eigenvalue a, and gets just a (equivalently, if one tests the support FS of S and gets that FS is possessed by x), one cannot assert that the state of x was S before the measurement, since there are many states that could yield outcome a and yet are different from S (for instance, all pure states that are represented by vectors that are not orthogonal to the vector representing S). But if one accepts the definition of states as equivalence classes of preparing devices propounded by Ludwig (and incorporated within the SR model(1)) one can know whether a given preparing device $`\pi `$ prepares physical objects in the state S (briefly, one can recognize S) by measuring mean values of suitable observables, which is obviously equivalent to testing second order properties. The simplest way of doing that is testing FS on a huge ensemble of objects prepared by $`\pi `$ by means of an ideal dichotomic device r: indeed, one can reasonably assume that $`\pi `$ belongs to the state S whenever r yields outcome 1 on all samples, that is, whenever FS is possessed by every physical object x prepared by $`\pi `$ or, equivalently, the mean value of FS is 1. In particular, if S is an entangled state of a compound physical system made up by two subsystems, this procedure allows one to distinguish S from a mixture MS corresponding to S via biorthogonal decomposition (see, e.g., Ref. 7). Also this remark is relevant to the quantum theory of measurement (see Sec. 6).

## 3. NONLOCALITY WITHIN STANDARD QM

The issue of nonlocality of QM was started by a famous paper by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR),(8) which however had different goals: indeed, it aimed to show that some reasonable assumptions, among which locality, imply that standard QM is not complete (in a very specific sense introduced by the authors), hence it can not be considered as a final theory of microworld. Later on, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, regarding two physical systems that have interacted in the past, was reformulated by Bohm(9) and a number of further thought experiments inspired by it were suggested and used in order to point out the conflict between standard QM and locality. Hence, one briefly says that standard QM is a nonlocal theory.

As anticipated in Sec. 1, we want to schematize some typical proofs of nonlocality in this section, in order to prepare the ground to our criticism in Sec. 4. For the sake of clearness, we proceed by steps.

(1) The existing proofs of nonlocality of QM can be grouped in two classes (see, e.g., Ref 10). (i)The proofs showing that deterministic local theories are inconsistent with QM. (ii)The more general proofs showing that stochastic local theories (which include deterministic local theories) are inconsistent with QM. For the sake of brevity, we will only consider the proofs in (i). It is indeed rather easy to extend our analysis and criticism to the proofs in (ii).

(2) We denote by QPL in the following a set of empirical quantum laws, which may be void (intuitively, a physical law is empirical if it can be directly checked, at least in principle, by means of suitable experiments, such as, for instance, the relations among compatible observables mentioned in the KS condition;(1) a more precise distinction between empirical and theoretical laws will be introduced in Sec. 4, (2)). We denote by LOC the assumption that QM is a local theory (in the standard EPR sense,222“Since at the time of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take place in the second system in consequence of anything that can be done to the first system”.(8) that can be rephrased by saying that a measurement on one of many spatially separated subsystems of a compound physical system does not affect the properties of the other subsystems). Finally, we denote by R the following assumption.

R. The values of all physical properties of any physical object are predetermined for any measurement context.

(3) Bearing in mind the definitions in (2), the general scheme of a typical proof of nonlocality is the following.

Firstly, one proves that

QPL and LOC and R $``$ (not QM),

or, equivalently,

QM $``$ (not QPL) or (not LOC) or (not R).

Secondly, since QM $``$ QPL, one gets

QM $``$ (not LOC) or (not R).

Finally, one proves that

QM and (not R) $``$ (not LOC),

so that one concludes

QM $``$ (not LOC).

(4) Let us consider some proofs of nonlocality and show that they actually follow the scheme in (3).

Bell’s original proof.(11) Here, the Bohm variant of the EPR thought experiment is considered (which refers to a compound system made up by a pair of spin-1/2 particles formed somehow in the singlet spin state and moving freely in opposite directions). Then, a Bell’s inequality concerning some expectation values (hence a physical law linking second order properties, see Sec. 2) is deduced by using assumptions LOC and R together with a perfect correlation law (PC: if the measurement on one of the particles gives the result spin up along the u direction, then a measurement on the other particle gives the result spin down along the same direction), which is an empirical law linking first order properties and following from the general theoretical laws of QM. The deduction is based on the fact that assumption R allows one to introduce hidden variables specifying the state of a physical system in a more complete way with respect to the quantum mechanical state. Then, the expectation values predicted by QM are substituted in the Bell’s inequality and found to violate it.

The above procedure can be summarized by the implication PC and LOC and R $``$ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme, with PC representing QPL in this particular case. One thus obtains QM $``$ (not LOC) or (not R) and concludes that QM contradicts local realism. The last step in the scheme was not done explicitly by Bell and can be carried out by adopting, for instance, the proof that PC and LOC $``$ R (hence PC and (not R) $``$ (not LOC)) propounded by Redhead.(12)

We add that the same paradigm, with PC as a special case of QPL, occurs in different proofs, as Wigner’s(13) and Sakurai’s.(14) In these proofs, however, an inequality is deduced (still briefly called Bell’s inequality) that concerns probabilities rather than expectation values.

Clauser et al.’s proof.(15) This proof introduces a generalized Bell’s inequality, sometimes called BCHSH’s inequality, that concerns expectation values (hence it expresses a physical law linking second order properties, as Bell’s inequality). This inequality is compared with the predictions of QM, finding contradictions. BCHSH’s inequality is deduced by using LOC and R only, so that one proves that LOC and R $``$ (not QM), hence QPL is void in this case. The rest of the proof can be carried out as in the general scheme.

Greenberger et al.’s proof.(16) Here no inequality is introduced. A system of four correlated spin-1/2 particles is considered, and the authors use directly a perfect correlation law PC1 (that generalizes the PC law mentioned above), R and LOC333To be precise, the authors introduce, besides LOC, realism and completeness in the EPR sense. These assumptions are however equivalent, as far as the proof is concerned, to assumption R. in order to obtain a contradiction with another perfect correlation law PC2, hence with QM. Thus, the authors prove that PC1 and LOC and R $``$ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme, with PC1 representing QPL in this case. Again, the rest of the proof can be carried out as in the general scheme.

Mermin’s proof.(17) Also this proof does not introduce inequalities. The author takes into account a system of three different spin-1/2 particles, assumes a quantum physical law linking first order properties (the product of four suitably chosen dichotomic nonlocal observables is equal to -1) together with LOC and (implicitly) R, and shows that this law cannot be fulfilled together with other similar laws following from QM. Thus, also Mermin proves an implication of the form QPL and LOC and R $``$ (not QM), from which the argument against LOC can be carried out as in the general scheme.

(5) The analysis in (4) shows that the scheme in (3) provides the general structure of the existing proofs of nonlocality. In this scheme, assumptions R and LOC play a crucial role. Let us therefore close our discussion by comparing R and LOC with the assumption of objectivity (briefly, O), which plays instead a crucial role in the proofs of contextuality of standard QM.(5)

Let us note firstly that assumption R expresses a minimal form of realism. This realism can be meant in a purely semantic sense, as objectivity (see Sec. 1), hence it is compatible with various forms of ontological realism (as the assumption about the existence of elements of reality in the EPR argument444“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to 1) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity”.(8)) but does not imply them.(4) Yet, R is weaker than O. Indeed, O entails that the values of physical properties are independent of the measuring apparatuses (noncontextuality), while R may hold also in a contextual theory (as Bohm’s), since it requires only that the values of physical properties are not brought into being by the very act of measuring them.555In order to avoid misunderstandings, we note explicitly that assumption R coincides with assumption R in Ref. 4 and not with assumption R in Ref. 5, which is instead the assumption of objectivity.

Let us note then that O also implies LOC, since it entails in particular that the properties of the subsystems of a compound physical system exist independently of any measurement. By putting this implication together with the implication O $``$ R, one gets O $``$ LOC and R. However, the converse implication does not hold, since R and LOC are compatible with the existence of measurements that do not influence each other at a distance but influence locally the values of the properties that are measured. Thus, we conclude that R and LOC are globally weaker than O.

## 4. RECOVERING LOCALITY WITHIN THE SR MODEL

It is well known that nonlocality of standard QM raises a number of problems and paradoxes. However, it has been proven in several papers (see, e.g., Refs. 4 and 18-20) that the general SR interpretation of QM invalidates some typical proofs of nonlocality. Basing on our analysis in Sec. 3, we want to attain in this section a similar result within the framework of the SR model, which has the substantial advantage of avoiding a number of logical and epistemological notions, making things clear within the standard language of QM. To this end, we use throughout in the following the definitions and concepts introduced in Ref. 1.

It is important to observe that we are led to question the proofs of nonlocality not only for general theoretical reasons (in particular, attaining a more intuitive local picture of the physical world) but also to avoid inconsistencies. Indeed, as we have anticipated in Sec. 1, the proofs in Sec. 3 raise a consistency problem. For, should they be valid within the SR model, QM would be a nonlocal theory also according to this model: but, then, the model could not provide an objective interpretation of QM, since objectivity entails both R and LOC (see (5) in Sec. 3).

For the sake of clearness, we again proceed by steps.

(1) Let us summarize some features of the SR model and introduce in it some simplifications that make it more intuitive and easy to handle.

Firstly, the main feature of the model is the substitution of every physical observable $`𝒜`$ of standard QM with an observable $`𝒜_0`$ in which a no-registration outcome a0 is added to the spectrum of $`𝒜`$. This is an old idea. Yet, a0 is interpreted in the model as a possible result of a measurement of $`𝒜_0`$ providing information about the physical object that is measured, which introduces a new perspective, since the occurrence of a0 is usually attributed to a lack of efficiency of the measuring apparatus. The family of properties associated with an observable $`𝒜_0`$ is then $`_{𝒜_0}`$ = $`\left\{\text{(}𝒜_0\text{,}\mathrm{\Delta }\text{)}\right\}_{\mathrm{\Delta }()\text{)}}`$ (where $``$($``$) denotes the $`\sigma `$-ring of all Borel sets on the real line $``$).

Secondly, states are defined as in standard QM, and all properties are assumed to be objective, hence the information about a physical object x following from the knowledge of its state is incomplete. Thus, there is a set of properties that are possessed by all objects in the state S (the set of properties that are certainly true in S, see Sec. 5), but different objects in S may differ because of further properties. One can then focus on some additional properties, take them (together with S) as initial, or boundary, conditions, and consider the subset of all objects in S that possess them. Different choices of the additional properties lead to different subsets (which may intersect). We briefly say that one can consider different physical situations. It is then apparent that these situations can be partitioned in two basically different classes. Indeed, one can choose as additional properties the property of being detected and some further properties (possibly none) that are pairwise commeasurable (i.e., simultaneously measurable, see Ref. 1): in this case an accessible physical situation is considered. On the contrary, if one chooses the property of being not detected or some further properties that are not pairwise commeasurable, a nonaccessible physical situation is considered.

Thirdly, the following nonclassical Metatheoretical Generalized Principle holds within the SR model (the same principle was stated in a number of previous papers, basing on general arguments, see, e.g., Refs. 3 and 5).

MGP. A physical statement expressing an empirical physical law is true whenever an accessible physical situation is considered, but it may be false (as well as true) whenever a nonaccessible physical situation is considered.

Finally, properties are represented by projection operators, as in standard QM, but the representation is not one-to-one, since the property ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), with a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, and the property ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }\left\{\text{a}_0\right\}`$) are represented by the same operator. This feature, however, makes the SR model unnecessarily complicate, since the representation of any property ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), with a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, is not needed in the following (nor to reach the conclusions in Ref. 1). Thus, we modify it here by simply assuming that projection operators represent bijectively (up to a physical equivalence relation, see Ref. 1) all properties of the form ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), with a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, while all remaining properties, though entering physical reasonings, have no mathematical representation. Then, we assume that the probability of a given property of the form ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), with a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, for a physical object in a given state can be evaluated, in every accessible physical situation, by referring to the representation of states and properties and using the rules of standard QM (the name SR model will refer to this simplified version of the model from now on). It follows in particular that all quantum laws expressed by the standard mathematical language of QM link only properties such that a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, which becomes intuitively clear within the picture provided at the end (see Sec. 7).

(2) MGP is an epistemological principle regarding the range of validity of physical laws, and it implies a change in our way of looking at the laws of QM, not a change in the laws themselves. Moreover, it provides the main argument against the standard proofs of nonlocality, that are thus criticized from an epistemological rather than from a technical viewpoint. MGP plays therefore a crucial role within the SR model, and it may be useful to reconsider here some arguments that suggest introducing it.

Let us begin by making clear the distinction between empirical and theoretical physical laws that is presupposed by MGP. In any theory, hence in QM, a law is said to be empirical if it is obtained from theoretical laws of the formal apparatus of the theory via correspondence rules and is expressed by a testable sentence of the observative language of the theory (see footnote 1), so that it may undergo a process of empirical control (theoretical laws can then be seen as schemes of laws, from which empirical laws can be deduced(21)). This definition, however, does not mean that an empirical law can always be checked. Let us consider, for example, an empirical law in which only pairwise commeasurable first order properties appear. If x is a physical object (in a state S) that is detected and, furthermore, additional properties are chosen that are pairwise commeasurable, and these properties are pairwise commeasurable with all properties appearing in the law, then an accessible physical situation is considered (see (1)), and one can check both whether x actually has all the hypothesized properties and whether the law holds. On the contrary, whenever x is not detected, or it is detected but additional properties are chosen that are not pairwise commeasurable with the properties appearing in the law, a nonaccessible physical situation is considered, and it is impossible either to make a check (if x is not detected) or to check both whether x has the hypothesized properties and whether the law holds (if x is detected).

The above example shows that one can consider physical situations in which an empirical physical law cannot, in principle, be checked. It is then consistent with the operational philosophy of QM to assume that the validity of an empirical law can be asserted only in accessible physical situations, which directly leads to MGP.

Finally, we note that, whenever an empirical law linking physical properties is expressed by means of the standard mathematical language of QM, then only objects that are actually detected are automatically considered, because of the simplification of the model introduced in (1). Also in this case, however, nonaccessible physical situations can occur whenever properties appear in the initial conditions (see (1)) that are represented by projection operators which do not commute with the projection operators representing the properties that appear in the law.

(3) Let us come now to our criticism of the standard proofs of nonlocality. Because of our analysis in Sec. 3, (4), this criticism can be carried out by referring to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3). Let us firstly show that the standard proofs of nonlocality are doubtful even if the SR model is ignored. To this end, note that also assumption R, though weaker than objectivity, implies that nonaccessible physical situations can be considered. Indeed, it follows from R that a value is defined for every property of a physical object x and for every measurement context, so that it is sufficient to choose a set of noncommeasurable properties for considering a situation of this kind. Moreover, direct inspection shows that the scheme in Sec. 3, (3) is not exhaustive. Indeed, all proofs of nonlocality considered in Sec. 3, (4) use, besides the explicit assumptions stated in the scheme, the implicit assumption that all empirical quantum laws can be applied to physical objects in every physical situation, be it accessible or not. This assumption is problematic if viewed at from a standard operational quantum viewpoint, since it introduces within QM a classical conception of empirical physical laws (we therefore call it Metatheoretical Classical Principle or briefly MCP,(3) in the following666Note that MCP implies assuming the KS condition stated by Kochen and Specker “for the successful introduction of hidden variables” in their proof of contextuality of QM,(22) and then adopted in all successive proofs of contextuality. Hence, our present criticism generalizes the criticism to the KS condition carried out in Ref. 1.).

Let us come, however, to the SR model. Within this model, objectivity implies that accessible and nonaccessible physical situations must be introduced, and MCP can be proven to break down by means of an example, while the weaker MGP holds.(1) Thus, the proofs in Sec. 3, (4) are invalid and the consistency problem pointed out at the beginning of this section is avoided.

To complete our argument, it remains to point out where exactly each of the aforesaid proofs uses MCP. Let us discuss this issue in some details.

(4) Firstly, let us consider Bell’s,(11) Wigner’s(13) and Sakurai’s(14) proofs. Here, it is immediate to see that the PC law is applied repeatedly to physical objects that are hypothesized to possess spin up along non-parallel directions. Hence, this law is directly applied in nonaccessible physical situations, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.

Secondly, let us consider Clauser’s et al.’s(15) proof. This proof deserves special attention, since no physical law linking first order properties is used in it. Therefore, let us observe that the BCHSH inequality contains a sum of expectation values in which noncompatible observables occur. Hence, every expectation value must be evaluated making reference to different sets of physical objects: all objects are prepared in the same entangled state (to be precise, the singlet state), but in each set only commeasurable physical properties are measured, which differ from set to set. The same procedure is needed if the quantum inequality corresponding to the BCHSH inequality is considered. Yet, according to the SR model, the expectation values in the BCHSH inequality are evaluated taking into account all physical objects in each set. On the contrary, the quantum rules provide probabilities referring to accessible situations only,(1) hence the expectation values in the quantum inequality take into account only the subsets of objects that are actually detected in each set. These subsets are selected by apparatuses that differ from set to set, and could be unfair statistical samples of the whole set to which they belong, since in each set the measurements select, because of the no-registration outcome that can occur,(1) a subset of physical objects in which the statistical relations among the measured properties can be different from the relations that hold in the original set and from the relations that hold in the other sets. Thus, the BCHSH and the quantum inequality cannot be identified, and no contradiction with QM occurs.

Note that we have avoided using MGP in the above argument since MGP has not been justified explicitly in the case of empirical laws linking second order properties (see (2); it is interesting to observe that the argument can then be used in order to justify MGP in this case). But if one accepts MGP, one can simply say that the quantum predictions on probabilities can be invalid, because of MGP, if also physical objects in nonaccessible physical situations are considered, as in the BCHSH inequality: hence, identifying this inequality with the corresponding quantum inequality violates MGP.

Thirdly, let us consider Greenberger et al.’s(16) proof. Here, different perfect correlation laws PC1 and PC2 are applied to the same physical object, and the properties in PC1 are not all commeasurable with the properties in PC2. Hence a nonaccessible physical situation is envisaged in which PC1 and PC2 are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.

Finally, let us consider Mermin’s(17) proof. Here, different quantum laws are applied to a given physical object, and there are observables in some of the laws that are not compatible (in the standard sense of QM) with some observables in the other laws. From the viewpoint of the SR model, this produces a nonaccessible physical situation in which some empirical physical laws are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.

(5) Coming back to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3), our arguments in (3) and (4) above can be summarized by saying that the implication QPL and LOC and R $``$ (not QM) must be substituted by QPL and LOC and R and MCP $``$ (not QM), which does not hold within the SR model (and is criticizable even within standard QM, see (3)), so that (not LOC) does not follow from QM.

We note explicitly that one can still object that our arguments in (3) are not conclusive. Indeed, objectivity does not imply only R and LOC, as pointed out in Sec. 3, (5), but also the weaker assumptions that are introduced when considering local stochastic theories (as the factorization of probabilities in objective local theories, see, e.g., Ref. 10), so that one should still show that the proofs that these theories are inconsistent with QM are invalid within the SR model. As we have anticipated in Sec. 3, (1), however, it is easy to extend our arguments in (3) in order to attain this invalidation.

(6) The result obtained in (3) raises, in particular, the problem of the role of Bell’s inequalities. Indeed, these inequalities are usually maintained to provide crucial tests for discriminating between local realism and QM (see, e.g., Refs. 7 and 23). One may then wonder about what would happen, according to the SR model, if one should perform a test of a Bell’s inequality: would it be violated or not? The answer is that there are basically two kinds of Bell’s inequalities, as our analysis in Sec. 3, (4) shows. Those obtained from assumptions LOC and R only, as BCHSH’s inequality, are correct theoretical formulas which are not epistemically accessible, hence cannot be tested (see also Refs. 4 and 24, where however the original Bell’s inequality was not classified properly). Any physical experiment tests something else (correlations among commeasurable properties of physical objects that are actually detected), hence yields the results predicted by QM. No contradiction occurs, since the inequalities that can be tested in QM could be identified with Bell’s inequalities only violating MGP. Thus, the latter inequalities do not provide methods for testing experimentally whether either QM or local realism is correct, according to the SR model. But the difference between quantum inequalities and Bell’s inequalities proves that some quantum laws regarding compound systems fail to hold in nonaccessible physical situations.

The above arguments do not apply to the inequalities that are deduced by using repeatedly a non void set QPL of empirical quantum laws besides R and LOC. These inequalities are simply incorrect according to the SR model, since they are deduced by applying QPL in nonaccessible physical situations.

## 5. OBJECTIVITY AND MEASUREMENT

The objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model avoids from the very beginning the main problem of the quantum theory of measurement, i.e. the objectification problem. Indeed, it allows one to interpret a measurement of a property F on a physical object x as an inquiry about whether F is possessed or not by x, not as an objectification of F. Generally speaking, this brings back the measurement problem to classical terms.

It must be stressed, however, that some typical quantum features do not disappear in the SR model. In particular, the existence of a non-trivial commeasurability relation prohibits one from testing all properties possessed by a given physical object x conjointly, so that the knowledge of all properties of x in a given state cannot be provided by any measurement. It is thus interesting to inquire further into the knowledge of properties that one attains when the state of x is specified. Therefore, let us suppose that x is in the (pure) state S represented by the vector $`\phi `$.777Because of the projection postulate, in standard QM one can obtain physical objects in the state S by choosing an observable $`𝒜`$ that has S as eigenstate belonging to a nondegenerate eigenvalue $`a`$, performing ideal measurements of $`𝒜`$ and selecting the objects that yield the outcome $`a`$. This procedure (with $`𝒜_0`$ in place of $`𝒜`$) is still valid within the SR model (see Sec. 6, Eq. (1)). It is easy to see that in the SR model (as in standard QM) a subset $`_S`$ exists, made up by properties that are certainly true in S (that is, have probability 1 in S). To be precise, $`_S`$ contains all properties of the form ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$) such that:

(i) $`𝒜_0`$ is a physical observable obtained from an observable $`𝒜`$ of standard QM by adding a no-registration outcome a0, see Sec. 4, (1);

(ii) $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ is a Borel set on the real line $``$ that includes a0;

(iii) ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }\backslash \left\{\text{a}_0\right\}`$) is represented by a projection operator P on the Hilbert space $``$ of the system such that P$`\phi `$ = $`\phi `$.

Indeed, if $`𝒜_0`$ is measured, one either gets outcome a0 (x is not registered) or an outcome that belongs to $`\mathrm{\Delta }\backslash \left\{\text{a}_0\right\}`$, since standard quantum rules hold for evaluating the probability of ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }\backslash \left\{\text{a}_0\right\}`$) in the state S (see Sec. 4, (1)), and $``$P$`\phi ^2`$ = 1 because of (iii). Analogously, one sees that a subset $`_S^{}`$ made up by properties that are certainly false in S (that is, have probability 0 in S) exists. To be precise, $`_S^{}`$ contains all properties of the form ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$) such that $`𝒜_0`$ is defined as in (i), $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ is a Borel set on the real line that does not include a0, and ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$) is represented by a projection operator P such that P$`\phi `$ = 0. Thus, one obtains that the specification of the state S of x provides information about the properties in the set $`_S_S^{}`$.

The set $`_S_S^{}`$, however, is strictly contained in the set $``$ of all properties, each of which is objective according to the SR model. It is indeed easy to see that there are properties in $``$$`\backslash `$($`_S_S^{}`$) such that one cannot deduce from knowing S whether they are possessed or not by x. Hence, the information provided by S is incomplete within the SR model (see Sec. 4, (1)). This has many relevant consequences. Let us point out here some of them.

Firstly, some pairwise commeasurable properties in $``$$`\backslash `$($`_S_S^{}`$) can be tested, so that for each of them one can say whether it was possessed or not by x (in the state S) before the measurement, increasing our information on x without introducing contradictions. This possibility does not occur in standard QM, where a property that has not probability 1 or 0 is not real in S, and a test actualizes it, so that one can say that it is possessed or not by x only after the measurement (hence, in general, in a state that is different from S). Thus, conjoint knowledge of pairs of arbitrary properties can be obtained in some cases in the SR model. For example, whenever one can predict that x possesses a property F1 at time t and a measurement of another property F2 on x at t yields outcome 1, then one knows that both F1 and F2 are possessed by x at t, whatever F1 and F2 may be.

Secondly, note that the conjoint knowledge mentioned above does not survive, in general, after t, since the interaction between x and the measuring apparatus may change the state of x (this issue will be discussed in more details in Sec. 6, referring to the special case of ideal measurements). Whatever it may be, however, such a change does not imply that the properties of x must be different after the measurement: it only implies a modification of our knowledge about the properties that are certainly possessed or not possessed by x. In different words, a measurement changes our information about x, but does not change necessarily the properties of x (though a change of properties may occur because of the interaction with the measuring apparatus). Again, this perspective is different from the perspective of standard quantum measurement theory, in which a change of state implies a change of the properties that are actual for x. We briefly call epistemic conception of states in the following the new viewpoint introduced by the SR model.

## 6. THE PROJECTION POSTULATE

Our discussion of measurements within the SR model in Sec. 5 is carried out by considering the microscopic physical system and the macroscopic measuring apparatus as distinct physical entities, according to a standard elementary way of dealing with measurement processes. It is well known, however, that some crucial problems occur in standard QM whenever one tries to select the subclass of apparatuses performing ideal (repeatable) measurements and treat them as macroscopic quantum systems, in order to provide a more complete description of the measurement process by considering the compound system formed by the microscopic system plus the measuring apparatus within standard QM. Indeed, two major difficulties occur.

(i) The unitary evolution of the whole system predicted by the Schrödinger equation implies that a pure initial state evolves into a pure final state, which may be entangled in such a way that neither the microscopic system nor the macroscopic apparatus possess individual properties.888We remind that, in order to know whether this occurs, one can consider the biorthogonal decomposition of the vector $`\chi `$ representing the final state S, according to which $`\chi `$ = $`_{iI}\sqrt{p_i}`$ $`\phi _i\psi _i`$, with I a set of indexes, p$`{}_{i}{}^{}>0`$, $`_{iI}p_i=1`$, $`\phi _i`$ and $`\psi _i`$ vectors representing states of the microscopic object and macroscopic apparatus, respectively. Whenever $`\left\{\phi _i\right\}_{iI}`$ and $`\left\{\psi _i\right\}_{iI}`$ are bases in the Hilbert spaces of the two component subsystems, it is easy to verify (by considering any projection operator representing a physical property of one of the two subsystems) that neither of these may possess individual properties. By the way, we also remind that the biorthogonal decomposition allows one to associate a state MS, which is represented by the density operator $`\rho =_{iI}p_i`$ $`\phi _i\psi _i`$ $`\phi _i\psi _i`$, with the pure state S. Of course, MS is a mixture (and differs from S) if I contains more than an element.

(ii) The experimental situation at the end of a measurement is described in standard QM by the projection postulate, which can be justified whenever the component subsystems are considered separately.999By using the symbols in footnote 8, we remind that this justification can be attained by representing the final state S by means of the projection operator P$`{}_{S}{}^{}=\chi \chi `$ rather than by means of the vector $`\chi `$, and then performing a partial trace of PS with respect to the subsystem that one does not want to consider. Yet, the projection postulate leads to predict a stochastic evolution according to which the final state of the whole system is a mixture rather than a pure state (to be precise, the mixture corresponding to the final state in (i) via biorthogonal decomposition8). This prediction implies that the component subsystems possess individual properties, which is consistent with observative data (one can indeed observe properties of the measuring apparatus directly). But it is then unclear how the stochastic evolution can be reconciled with the unitary evolution that should occur according to the Schrödinger equation, and, in particular, with nonobjectivity.

The attempts to solve the above problems have produced a huge and generally known literature, that we do not list here for the sake of brevity. Rather, we would like to provide in this section a first, qualitative treatment of these problems from the viewpoint of the SR model.

First of all, we note that we have not yet introduced any assumption about time evolution in the SR model. However, consistency with standard QM suggests one to maintain that also in this model the vector representing a pure state of the whole system undergoes unitary evolution. Furthermore, one is also led to maintain that, whenever ideal measurements are performed and the a0 outcome does not occur, the projection postulate provides a good description of probabilities and final states of the system.

Let us come now to difficulties (i) and (ii) above. It is apparent that the assumption of unitary evolution, though identical to the standard QM assumption, does not raise any problem within the SR model when applied to the measurement process. Indeed, objectivity implies that every conceivable property of microscopic system or measuring apparatus either is possessed or not by the subsystem that is considered, even if one cannot generally know a priori which of the two alternatives occurs (it follows, in particular, that no special argument, or additional assumption, or modification of time evolution is needed in order to explain macroscopic objectivity). This implies that difficulty (i) disappears. Furthermore, also the contradiction in (ii) between unitary and stochastic evolution is far less relevant because of objectivity, since all properties of the component subsystems are actual according to both descriptions within the SR model. Hence, one can safely resort to the old idea of reconciling the two descriptions by assuming that one of them is theoretically rigorous, the other one is approximate. In order to implement this idea, let us provide a possible scheme of description of the measuring process within the SR model, matching the standard simplified description of this process that is used in many books in order to show in an elementary way that unitary evolution does not fit in with the evolution predicted via projection postulate (see, e.g., Ref. 25).

For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a discrete, nondegenerate observable $`𝒜_0`$ with eigenvalues a0, a1, a2, … and let $`\psi _0`$, $`\psi _1`$, $`\psi _2`$, … be the vectors representing the statuses of a macroscopic apparatus measuring $`𝒜_0`$ that correspond to a0, a1, a2, … respectively. Furthermore, let $`\phi _1`$, $`\phi _2`$, … be vectors in the Hilbert space of the microscopic system x such that, if x is in the state described by $`\phi _i`$, either it is not detected (outcome a0) or the outcome ai is obtained. Whenever the initial state of the whole system before the measurement is represented by the product vector $`\chi _i^{(i)}`$ = $`\phi _i\psi _0`$, the final state at the end of the measurement is represented by the vector

$$\chi _i^{(f)}=t_i\phi _i\psi _i+t_i^{^{}}\phi _i^{^{}}\psi _0,$$
(1)
where $`t_i^2`$ and $`t_i^{^{}}^2=1t_i^2`$ are the probabilities of the ai and the a0 outcomes, respectively, and $`\phi _i^{^{}}`$ is an unknown final state of the microscopic system. If one assumes that the whole system undergoes unitary evolution and that its initial state is represented by the product vector $`\chi ^{(i)}`$ = $`(_ic_i\phi _i)\psi _0`$, the final state is represented by the vector

$$\chi ^{(f)}=\underset{i}{}c_it_i\phi _i\psi _i+\underset{i}{}c_it_i^{^{}}\phi _i^{^{}}\psi _0.$$
(2)
If one requires consistency with the standard picture, the state Sf represented (up to a normalization constant) by the vector $`_ic_it_i\phi _i\psi _i`$ should coincide with the state predicted by standard QM. The above description shows that Sf is generally different from the final state of all samples at the end of the measurement, and refers to the samples of the whole system in which the a0 outcome does not occur, that are selected by the observer through direct inspection of the apparatus (which does not introduce contradictions because of the epistemic conception of states pointed out in Sec. 5; note that the selection performed by the observer plays the role of a second measurement on the whole system, without implying, however, any problematic objectification induced by the conscience of the observer himself).

Let us remind now that standard QM shows that one cannot distinguish an entangled state from the mixture corresponding to it (via biorthogonal decomposition8) by simply considering probabilities of properties of the component subsystems separately.(26) But if one considers in standard QM the entangled state Sf produced by unitary evolution at the end of a measurement, one may maintain that Sf can be distinguished from the corresponding mixture M$`_{S_f}`$ predicted via projection postulate by means of repeated measurements of the support F$`_{S_f}`$ of Sf on set of samples of the whole system consisting of the microscopic system plus the macroscopic measuring apparatus (see end of Sec. 2). This is however impossible in practice. Alternatively, one could measure a number of correlation properties by making measurements of first order properties on the two subsystems separately (see again Sec. 2; it may also occur that different correlation properties require measuring different noncommeasurable observables on the macroscopic apparatus). But also this procedure is practically impossible. Hence, it is reasonable to maintain within the SR model that the description of the samples in which the a0 outcome does not occur by means of M$`_{S_f}`$ is an approximation, which is equivalent FAPP (for all practical purposes) to the description provided by Sf. Thus, because of objectivity, stochastic evolution can be seen as an approximate law, valid for a special class of measuring devices (performing ideal measurements) and in accessible physical situations, which avoids the complications of a complete quantum description of the measurement process and is hardly distinguishable from the correct theoretical law.

The problems raised by the projection postulate are thus greatly undramatized in our perspective. Moreover, this postulate provides a correct description of the microscopic system after a measurement in standard QM (see (ii) above), hence also within the SR model if one considers only physical objects that are actually detected. We therefore close this section pointing out some consequences of it in the framework of the SR model and showing that these consequences are consistent with the general remarks on the measurement process made in Sec. 5.

To begin with, let us observe that one can introduce a physically meaningful relation of consistency on the set of all pure states of a physical system in the SR model by saying that the pure states S1 and S2 are consistent iff the vectors $`\phi _1`$ and $`\phi _2`$ that represent them, respectively, are not orthogonal. Indeed, if S1 and S2 are consistent, there is no property that is certainly possessed by a physical object x if x is in the state S1 and certainly not possessed if x is in the state S2. On the contrary, such a property exists if S1 and S2 are not consistent. Thus, S1 and S2 are consistent iff x can possess the same properties in the state S1 and in the state S2 (of course, we cannot know whether this actually occurs, since the knowledge of the state of a physical object provides only incomplete information about its properties, see Sec. 5).

Then, the description of measurements provided by the projection postulate has the following features in the SR model (see also Ref. 3).

(i) The final pure state Sj of a physical object x after a measurement of an observable $`𝒜_0`$ that yields the (possibly degenerate) eigenvalue aj is consistent with the pure state S of x before the measurement. Indeed, S and Sj are represented by non-orthogonal vectors. This implies that x may possess the same properties before and after the measurement. Hence, the measurement produces a change of our information about x, but it does not necessarily imply a change of the properties of x (though a change of the set of properties possessed by x may actually occur because of the interaction of the physical object with the measuring apparatus). We thus get, by using the projection postulate, the same result that we have obtained by means of general arguments in Sec. 5 (which introduces, as we have already observed, a viewpoint that is deeply different from the viewpoint adopted by the standard quantum measurement theory).

Note that if Sj and Sk are the pure states predicted by the projection postulate after distinct measurements on a physical object x in the state S that yield the eigenvalues aj and ak of the observable $`𝒜_0`$, respectively, Sj and Sk are not consistent, since the vectors representing them are orthogonal. This matches with the fact that the properties F$`_{S_j}`$ = “having value aj of $`𝒜_0`$” and F$`_{S_K}`$ = “having value ak of $`𝒜_0`$”, that are the supports of Sj and Sk, respectively, are mutually exclusive.

(ii) Let Sa and Sb be the pure states predicted by the projection postulate after (ideal) measurements on a physical object x in the state S that yield the eigenvalues a and b of the observables $`𝒜_0`$ and $`_0`$, respectively. Then, Sa and Sb can be consistent even when the properties Fa = “having value a of $`𝒜_0`$” and Fb = “having value b of $`_0`$”, that are the supports of Sa and Sb, respectively, are noncommeasurable. This occurs whenever the vectors $`\phi _a`$ and $`\phi _b`$ that represent Sa and Sb, respectively, are not orthogonal, and intuitively means that x may possess both properties Fa and Fb conjointly, even if one cannot generally know whether this occurs by means of a conjoint measurement of them (yet, one can attain this knowledge in some cases by means of a prediction followed by a measurement, as we have seen in Sec. 5). Again, this feature distinguishes the viewpoint provided by the SR model from the standard interpretation, according to which Fa and Fb can never be simultaneously real for the physical object x.

## 7. AN INTUITIVE PICTURE FOR THE SR MODEL

Our treatment of the locality and measurement problems in the previous sections has been carried out by referring to the SR model in which macroscopic properties only are considered, so that strict operational requirements are fulfilled (though the SR model does not adopt a verificationist attitude, see Ref. 1). Therefore, our perspective does not provide an intuitive picture of what is going on at the microscopic level. But if one accepts introducing microscopic properties of physical objects such a picture becomes possible and it has been recently propounded by one of us as an autonomous model(27), based on the extended SR model expounded in Ref. 1 but bringing in it some important corrections. The new model provides a sample of objective interpretation of QM, and all relevant features of the SR model hold in it (in particular, MGP), so that it can be regarded from our present viewpoint as a set-theoretical proof of the consistency of the SR model. For the sake of completeness we therefore report the essentials of it here.

To begin with, we accept the correspondence of microscopic and macroscopic properties established in the framework of the extended SR model. To be precise, we assume that every microscopic physical system is characterized by a set $``$ of microscopic physical properties (which play the role of theoretical entities), and that every sample of the system (physical object) either possesses or does not possess each property in $``$. Moreover, every microscopic property f in $``$ corresponds to a macroscopic property F = ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), where $`𝒜_0`$ is an observable and $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ a Borel set on the real line such that a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$, hence is represented by the same projection operator that represents ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$). Whenever a physical object x is prepared by a given preparing device $`\pi `$ (for the sake of simplicity we assume here that the equivalence class of $`\pi `$ is a pure state S, see Ref. 1, Sec. 2) and $`𝒜_0`$ is measured by means of a suitable apparatus, the set of microscopic properties possessed by x produces a probability (which is either 0 or 1 if the model is deterministic) that the apparatus does not react, so that the outcome a0 may be obtained. In this case, a nonaccessible physical situation occurs, and we cannot get any explicit information about the microscopic physical properties possessed by x. In particular, we cannot assert that they are related as the projection operators representing them are related by the laws of standard QM, which is consistent with MGP. If, on the contrary, the apparatus reacts, an outcome different from a0, say a, is obtained, and we are informed that x possesses all microscopic properties associated with macroscopic properties of the form F = ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$), where $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ is a Borel set such that a$`{}_{0}{}^{}\mathrm{\Delta }`$ and a $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$ (for the sake of brevity, we also say that x possesses all macroscopic properties as F in this case). Then, whenever a law of standard QM is considered, both accessible and nonaccessible physical situations may occur, and only in the former situations we can assert that the microscopic properties of x are related as the projection operators representing them in the given law.

Let us come now to our intuitive picture. Whenever the preparing device $`\pi `$ is activated repeatedly, a (finite) set $`𝒮`$ of physical objects in the state S is prepared. Let us partition $`𝒮`$ into subsets $`𝒮^{(1)}`$, $`𝒮^{(2)}`$, …, $`𝒮^{(n)}`$, such that in each subset all objects possess the same microscopic properties, and assume that a measurement of an observable $`𝒜_0`$ is done on every object. Furthermore, let us introduce the following symbols.

N: number of physical objects in $`𝒮`$.

N0: number of physical objects in $`𝒮`$ that are not detected.

N(i): number of physical objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$.

N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{0}{}^{}`$: number of physical objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$ that are not detected.

N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{F}{}^{}`$: number of physical objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$ that possess the macroscopic property F = ($`𝒜_0`$,$`\mathrm{\Delta }`$) corresponding to the microscopic property f.

It follows from our above interpretation that the number N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{F}{}^{}`$ either coincides with N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}`$N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{0}{}^{}`$ or with 0. The former case occurs whenever f is possessed by the objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$, since all objects that are detected then yield outcome in $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$. The latter case occurs whenever f is not possessed by the objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$, since all objects that are detected then yield outcome different from a0 but outside $`\mathrm{\Delta }`$. In both cases one generally gets N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}`$N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{0}{}^{}`$ $``$ 0 (even if N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}`$N$`{}_{}{}^{(i)}{}_{0}{}^{}`$ = 0 may also occur, in particular in a deterministic model), so that the following equation holds:

$$\frac{N_F^{(i)}}{N^{(i)}}=\frac{N^{(i)}N_0^{(i)}}{N^{(i)}}\frac{N_F^{(i)}}{N^{(i)}N_0^{(i)}}.$$
(3)
The term on the left in Eq. (3) represents the frequency of objects possessing the property F in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$, the first term on the right the frequency of objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$ that are detected, the second term (which either is 1 or 0) the frequency of objects that possess the property F in the subset of all objects in $`𝒮^{(i)}`$ that are detected.

The frequency of objects in $`𝒮`$ that possess the property F is given by

$$\frac{1}{N}\underset{i}{}N_F^{(i)}=\frac{NN_0}{N}(\underset{i}{}\frac{N_F^{(i)}}{NN_0}).$$
(4)
Let us assume now that all frequencies converge in the large number limit, so that they can be substituted by probabilities, and that these probabilities do not depend on the choice of the preparation $`\pi `$ in S (which is consistent with the definition of states in Ref. 1, Sec. 2). Hence, if one considers the large number limit of Eq. (3), one gets

$$𝒫_S^{(i)t}(F)=𝒫^{(i)d}(F)𝒫_S^{(i)}(F),$$
(5)
where $`𝒫_S^{(i)t}(F)`$ is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object x possessing the microscopic properties that characterize $`𝒮^{(i)}`$ also possess the property F, $`𝒫_S^{(i)d}(F)`$ as the probability that x be detected when F is measured on it, $`𝒫_S^{(i)}(F)`$ (which either is 0 or 1) as the probability that x possess the property F when detected. Moreover, if one considers the large number limit of Eq. (4) and reminds the interpretation of quantum probabilities in Sec. 4, (1), it is reasonable to assume that the second term on the right converges to the standard quantum probability $`𝒫_S(F)`$ that a physical object in the state S possess the property F, so that one gets

$$𝒫_S^t(F)=𝒫^d(F)𝒫_S(F),$$
(6)
where $`𝒫_S^t(F)`$ is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object x in a state S possess the property F and $`𝒫_S^d(F)`$ as the probability that x be detected when F is measured on it. Thus, one can maintain that a broader theory embodying QM can be conceived, according to which the standard quantum probability $`𝒫_S(F)`$ is considered as a conditional rather than an absolute probability. Of course, Eq. (6) is also compatible with a model in which $`𝒫^d(F)`$ is interpreted as the efficiency of a non-ideal measuring apparatus. Yet, our picture predicts that $`𝒫^d(F)`$ may be less than 1 also in the case of an ideal apparatus. Indeed, every $`\pi `$ in S prepares objects which do not possess the same microscopic properties, and some objects may possess sets of properties that make the detection of them by any apparatus measuring F possible but not certain, or even impossible.

To close up, let us note that the intuitive picture provided above introduces a substantial correction in the extended SR model that inspires it, since it substitutes Eq. (5) to the equation $`𝒫_{𝒜_0S}(F)`$ = $`𝒫_{𝒜_0}(F,G,H,\mathrm{})𝒫_S(F)`$ that appears in this model. Bearing in mind its definition, the probability $`𝒫_{𝒜_0S}(F)`$ can be obtained as the large number limit of the term on the left in Eq. (3) (which shows that the suffix S in it is rather misleading). Analogously, the probability $`𝒫_{𝒜_0}(F,G,H,\mathrm{})`$ can be obtained as the large number limit of the first term on the right in the same equation. However, the second term on the right in Eq. (3) does not converge to the quantum probability $`𝒫_S(F)`$, hence the above equation of the extended SR model is not correct in our new picture. We observe, however, that also in this picture the fair sampling assumption does not hold, which is important for theoretical reasons (see Ref. 1, Sec. 5).

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to thank Prof. Carlo Dalla Pozza, Prof. Arcangelo Rossi and Prof. Luigi Solombrino for valuable help and suggestions.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1 Introduction

The notion of information proposed by Fisher is fundamental in probability and statistics for a number of reasons; here we mention only the Cramer-Rao inequality and the asymptotic behaviour of maximum lilkelihood estimators for exponential models (one can see  for unexpected features and applications of Fisher information). In classical statistics Rao was the first to point out that Fisher information can be seen as a riemannian metric on the space of probability densities. This point of view was nicely complemented by the results of Chentsov saying that (on the simplex of probability vectors) Fisher information is the unique riemannian metric contracting under Markov morphisms. This can be rephrased in a more suggestive way. Markov morphisms, or positive mappings, are the mathematical counterpart of the notion of noise. Now suppose that we want to use a distance to distinguish different states (probability densities) in a statistically relevant way. Then the effect of noise must be that of contracting the metric. Chentsov theorem says therefore that in the classical case there is only one choice, the Fisher information (another argument producing Fisher information can be found in ).

In the quantum case one deals with density operators instead of density vectors and completely positive mappings play the role of Markov morphisms. As often happens in the quantum counterpart of a classical theory, instead of a uniqueness result, one has a classification theorem, due to Petz. This result states that there is bijection between statistically monotone metrics on quantum state space and the operator monotone functions: we have therefore a rich “garden” of candidates for the role of Fisher information in quantum physics. Among the elements of this family of metrics one can find, in a certain sense, the most relevant riemannian metrics appeared in the literature .

Despite the existence of general results for the theory  a number of open problems resists to investigation. For example it does not exist yet a general formula for the geodesic path and the geodesic distance associated to an arbitrary monotone metric. For the use of this kind of distances see for example . Because of the absence of a general formula, inequalities (giving bounds for the geodesic distance) have been proved .

In this paper we discuss the Wigner-Yanase skew information. To find the formulae for geodesic path and geodesic distance we mimic the classical approach to Fisher information via sphere geometry (one should note the importance of determining geodesic path in the study of the 2-Wasserstein metric ). Indeed Wigner-Yanase information appears as the pull-back of the square root map . Next we prove the formula for the scalar curvature. One proof, due to J.Dittmann, uses the general formula  and requires a long calculation. The second one just uses the pull-back approach. One should emphasize that, since the scalar curvature determines the asymptotic behaviour of the volume (for a riemannian metric) then it has also a statistical meaning in relation to the quantum analogue of Jeffrey’s rule for determining prior probability distributions (see ). Finally we prove, as a corollary of the results in  that the Wigner-Yanase information is the only monotone metric that can be seen as a pull-back metric.

The paper is organised as follows. In section II we review the geometric approach to Fisher information. In section III one finds an introduction to the general theory of statistical monotone metrics. Section IV shows how the Wigner-Yanase information can be seen as a monotone riemannian metric. In section V we show that the Wigner-Yanase geometry can be seen as the sphere geometry transposed on the space of density matrices; moreover we characterise it as the unique pull-back metric. Section VI contains some comments on the main results and on some open problems.

## 2 Fisher information and its geometry

The classical definition of Fisher information for an indexed family of densities $`p_\theta `$ is given by the variance of the score. In the case of a family indexed by only one parameter $`\theta `$ it is the number

$$I(\theta )=\text{E}_\theta \left[\left(\frac{}{\theta }\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)^2\right]$$
(2.1)
assigned to the parameter $`\theta `$. For $`n`$ parameters, say $`\theta =(\theta ^1,\mathrm{},\theta ^n)`$, it is a matrix defined on the parameter manifold given by

$$I(\theta )_{ij}=\text{E}_\theta \left[\left(\frac{}{\theta ^i}\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)\left(\frac{}{\theta ^j}\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)\right].$$
(2.2)
Geometrically this means, that $`I(\theta )`$ is a symmetric bilinear form on the tangent spaces of the parameter manifold. In a coordinate free language it reads as

$$I(\theta )(U,V)=\text{E}_\theta \left[U\left(\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)V\left(\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)\right],$$
(2.3)
where $`U`$ and $`V`$ are vectors tangent to the parameter manifold and $`U\left(\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)`$ is the derivative of $`\mathrm{log}p_\theta `$ along the direction $`U`$, that means $`U\left(\mathrm{log}p_\theta \right)=\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\mathrm{log}p_{\theta +tU}^{}{}_{|t=0}{}^{}`$.

$`I(\theta )`$ is a measure for the statistical distinguishabilty of distribution parameters. Under certain regularity conditions for $`\theta p_\theta `$ the image of this mapping is a manifold of distributions. This manifold is the actual object of interest in information geometry rather than the space of distribution parameters and formula (2.3) defines a Riemannian metric $`g`$ on it (for a general reference see ). Indeed, a vector $`u`$ tangent to this manifold is of the form

$$u=\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}p_{\theta +tU}^{}{}_{|t=0}{}^{}$$

and the right hand side of (2.3) now reads as

$$g(u,v):=\text{E}_p\left[\frac{u}{p}\frac{v}{p}\right]$$
(2.4)
defining the Fisher metric on the manifold of densities. If the differential of $`\theta p_\theta `$ is not injective, than there is some parameter redundance or ambiguity in the choice of $`U`$ and $`V`$, and therefore the right hand side of (2.3) does not depend on this choice.

We restrict now to $`𝒫_n^n`$, the simplex of strictly positive probability vectors, that is $`𝒫_n:=\{\rho ^n:_{i=1}^n\rho _i=1,\rho _i>0,i=1,\mathrm{},n\}`$. An element $`\rho 𝒫_n`$ is a density on the $`n`$-point set $`\{1,\mathrm{},n\}`$ with $`\rho (i)=\rho _i`$. We regard an element $`u`$ of the tangent space $`\mathrm{T}_\rho 𝒫_n\{u^n:_{i=1}^nu_i=0\}`$ as a function $`u`$ on $`\{1,\mathrm{},n\}`$ with $`u(i)=u_i`$.

###### Definition 2.1.

The Fisher-Rao Riemannian metric on $`\mathrm{T}_\rho 𝒫_n`$ is given by

$$u,v_\rho ^F:=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}\frac{u_iv_i}{\rho _i}$$
(2.5)
for $`u,v\mathrm{T}_\rho 𝒫_n`$.

To see the relation between this metric and the Fisher metric, let $`u,v\mathrm{T}_\rho 𝒫_n`$. We obtain from (2.4)

$$g(u,v)=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}\frac{u(i)}{\rho _i}\frac{v(i)}{\rho _i}\rho _i=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}\frac{u_iv_i}{\rho _i}$$

in accordance with (2.5).

The following result is well known and is a very special case of a far more general situation (see  for example).

###### Theorem 2.2.

The manifold $`𝒫_n`$ equipped with the Fisher-Rao Riemannian metric $`,^F`$ is isometric with an open subset of the sphere of radius 2 in $`^n`$.

###### Proof.

We consider the mapping $`\phi :𝒫_nS_2^{n1}^n`$,

$$\phi (\rho ):=2(\sqrt{\rho _1},\mathrm{},\sqrt{\rho _n}).$$

Then $`D_\rho \phi (u)=(\frac{u_1}{\sqrt{\rho _1}},\mathrm{},\frac{u_n}{\sqrt{\rho _n}})`$ and we get

$$D_\rho \phi \left(,^F\right)(u,v):=D_\rho \phi (u),D_\rho \phi (v)^^n=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{}}\frac{u_iv_i}{\rho _i}=u,v_\rho ^F.$$

Hence the standard metric on the sphere of radius 2 is pulled back to the Fisher-Rao Riemannian metric. ∎

This identification of $`𝒫_n`$ with an open subset of a radius 2 sphere allows for obtaining differential geometrical quantities of the Riemannian manifold $`(𝒫_n,,^F)`$. From the very definition of geodesic distance, geodesic path and scalar curvature, one has for $`S_r^{n1}`$, with $`P_1,P_2S_r^{n1}`$,
1) geodesic distance

$$d(P_1,P_2)=r\text{arcos}\left(\frac{P_1,P_2}{r^2}\right)$$

2) geodesic path connecting $`P_1`$ and $`P_2`$ :

$$\gamma ^{P_1,P_2}(t)=r\frac{(1t)P_1+tP_2}{(1t)P_1+tP_2}$$

(of course, $`t`$ is not the arc length parameter);
3) scalar curvature

$$\text{Scal}(v)=\frac{1}{r^2}(n1)(n2)$$

because $`S_r^{n1}`$ has constant sectional curvature equal to $`\frac{1}{r^2}`$.

Let us denote by $`d_F,\gamma _F,\text{Scal}_F`$ respectively the corresponding quantities for the Fisher information. The above considerations give, for $`\rho ,\sigma 𝒫_n`$,
1) Bhattacharya distance

$$d_\text{F}(\rho ,\sigma )=2\text{arccos}\left(\underset{i}{}\rho _i^{1/2}\sigma _i^{1/2}\right)$$

2) geodesic path connecting $`\rho `$ and $`\sigma `$:

$$\gamma _\text{F}^{\rho ,\sigma }(t)=2\frac{((1t)\sqrt{\rho }+t\sqrt{\sigma })^2}{_i((1t)\sqrt{\rho _i}+t\sqrt{\sigma _i})^2}$$

3) scalar curvature

$$\text{Scal}_\text{F}(\rho )=\frac{1}{4}(n1)(n2)\rho 𝒫_n.$$

The Levi-Civita connection associated to Fisher metric can be decomposed using the geometry of mixture and exponential models. The rest of the section explains how.

###### Definition 2.3.

A dualistic structure on a manifold $``$ is a triple $`(,,,\stackrel{~}{})`$ where $`,`$ is a riemannian metric on $``$ and $`,\stackrel{~}{}`$ are affine connections on $``$ such that

$$XY,Z=_XY,Z+Y,\stackrel{~}{}_XZ$$

where $`X,Y,Z`$ are vector fields. If $`U^{},U^\stackrel{~}{}`$ are the parallel transport associated to $`,\stackrel{~}{}`$ then the above equation is equivalent to

$$U^{}(u),U^\stackrel{~}{}(v)=u,v.$$

A divergence on a manifold is a smooth nonnegative function $`D:\times `$ such that $`D(\rho ,\sigma )=0`$ iff $`\rho =\sigma `$. To each divergence $`D`$ one may associate a dualistic structure $`(,,,\stackrel{~}{})`$ (see ).

Let $`^2`$ be the Levi-Civita connection of Fisher information. The Kullback-Leibler relative entropy $`K(\rho ,\sigma )=_i\rho _i(\mathrm{log}\rho _i\mathrm{log}\sigma _i)`$ gives a dualistic structure $`(,^F,^m,^e)`$ such that

$$^2=\frac{1}{2}(^m+^e)$$

where $`^m,^e`$ are the mixture and exponential connections. These connections are torsion free and flat: once the representation by scores is used for the tangent spaces, the associated parallel transports are given by

$$U_{\rho \sigma }^m:T_\rho 𝒫T_\sigma 𝒫U_{\rho \sigma }^m(u)=\frac{\rho }{\sigma }u$$

$$U_{\rho \sigma }^e:T_\rho 𝒫T_\sigma 𝒫U_{\rho \sigma }^e(u)=u\text{E}_\sigma (u).$$

The geodesics of $`^m,^e`$ are, respectively, the mixture and exponential models.

## 3 Metric contraction under coarse graining

In the commutative case a Markov morphism (or stochastic map) is a positive operator $`T:^n^k`$. In the noncommutative case a stochastic map is a completely positive and trace preserving operator $`T:M_nM_k`$ where $`M_n`$ denotes the space of $`n`$ by $`n`$ complex matrices. We shall denote by $`𝒟_n`$ the manifold of strictly positive elements of $`M_n`$ and by $`𝒟_n^1𝒟_n`$ the submanifold of density matrices.

In the commutative case a monotone metric is a family of riemannian metrics $`g=\{g^n\}`$ on $`\{𝒫_n\}`$, $`n`$ such that

$$g_{T(\rho )}^m(TX,TX)g_\rho ^n(X,X)$$

holds for every stochastic mapping $`T:^n^m`$ and all $`\rho 𝒫_n`$ and $`XT_\rho 𝒫_n`$.

In perfect analogy, a monotone metric in the noncommutative case is a family of Riemannian metrics $`g=\{g^n\}`$ on $`\{𝒟_n^1\}`$, $`n`$ such that

$$g_{T(\rho )}^m(TX,TX)g_\rho ^n(X,X)$$

holds for every stochastic mapping $`T:M_nM_m`$ and all $`\rho 𝒟_n^1`$ and $`XT_\rho 𝒟_n^1`$.

Let us recall that a function $`f:(0,\mathrm{})`$ is called operator monotone if for any $`n`$, any $`A`$, $`BM_n`$ such that $`0AB`$, the inequalities $`0f(A)f(B)`$ hold. An operator monotone function is said symmetric if $`f(x):=xf(x^1)`$ and normalized if $`f(1)=1`$. In what follows by operator monotone we mean normalised symmetric operator monotone. With each operator monotone function $`f`$ one associates also the so-called Chentsov–Morotzova function

$$c_f(x,y):=\frac{1}{yf(\frac{x}{y})}\text{for}x,y>0.$$

Define $`L_\rho (A):=\rho A`$, and $`R_\rho (A):=A\rho `$. Since $`L_\rho ,R_\rho `$ commute we may define $`c(L_\rho ,R_\rho )`$. Now we can state the fundamental theorems about monotone metrics (uniqueness and classification are up to scalars).

###### Theorem 3.1.

 There exists a unique monotone metric on $`𝒫_n`$ given by the Fisher information.

###### Theorem 3.2.

 There exists a bijective correspondence between monotone metrics on $`𝒟_n^1`$ and operator monotone functions given by the formula

$$A,B_{\rho ,f}:=Tr(Ac_f(L_\rho ,R_\rho )(B)).$$

The tangent space to $`𝒟_n^1`$ at $`\rho `$ is given by $`T_\rho 𝒟_n^1\{AM_n:A=A^{},Tr(A)=0\}`$, and can be decomposed as $`T_\rho 𝒟_n^1=(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^c(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^o`$, where $`(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^c:=\{AT_\rho 𝒟_n^1:[A,\rho ]=0\}`$, and $`(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^o`$ is the orthogonal complement of $`(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^c`$, with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt scalar product $`A,B:=Tr(A^{}B)`$. Each statistically monotone metric has a unique expression (up to a constant) given by $`Tr(\rho ^1A^2)`$, for $`A(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^c`$. The following result will be used in Section 5.

###### Proposition 3.3.

(See ). Let $`AT_\rho 𝒟_n^1`$ be decomposed as $`A=A^c+i[\rho ,U]`$ where $`A^c(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^c`$ and $`i[\rho ,U](T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^o`$. Suppose $`\phi 𝒞^1(0,+\mathrm{})`$. Then

$$(D_\rho \phi )(A)=\phi ^{}(\rho )A^c+i[\phi (\rho ),U].$$

As proved by Lesniewski and Ruskai each monotone metric is the hessian of a suitable relative entropy; to state this result more precisely, we introduce some notation. In what follows $`g`$ is an operator convex function defined on $`(0,+\mathrm{})`$ and such that $`g(1)=0`$. The formula

$$f(x)f_g(x):=\frac{(x1)^2}{g(x)+xg(x^1)}$$

associates a normalised, symmetric operator monotone function $`f=f_g`$ to each $`g`$. We denote by $`\mathrm{\Delta }_{\sigma ,\rho }=L_\sigma R_\rho ^1`$ the relative modular operator. The relative $`g`$–entropy of $`\rho `$ and $`\sigma `$ is defined as

$$H_g(\rho ,\sigma ):=Tr(\rho ^{\frac{1}{2}}g(\mathrm{\Delta }_{\sigma ,\rho })(\rho ^{\frac{1}{2}})).$$

$`H_g`$ is a divergence on $`𝒟_n`$ in the sense of . If $`\rho ,\sigma `$ are diagonal $`H_g`$, reduces to the commutative relative $`g`$–entropy (see ).

###### Theorem 3.4.

 Let $`g`$ be operator convex, $`g(1)=0`$, $`f=f_g`$ and $`\rho 𝒟_n`$. Then

$$\frac{}{t}\frac{}{s}H_g(\rho +tA,\rho +sB)|_{t=s=0}=Tr(Ac_f(L_\rho ,R_\rho )(B)).$$

To state the general formula for the scalar curvature of a monotone metric we need some auxiliary functions. In what follows $`c^{},(\mathrm{log}c)^{}`$ denote derivatives with respect to the first variable, and $`c=c_f`$.

$`h_1(x,y,z)`$ $`:=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{c(x,y)zc(x,z)c(y,z)}{(xz)(yz)c(x,z)c(y,z)}},`$
$`h_2(x,y,z)`$ $`:=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{\left(c(x,z)c(y,z)\right)^2}{(xy)^2c(x,y)c(x,z)c(y,z)}},`$
$`h_3(x,y,z)`$ $`:=`$ $`z{\displaystyle \frac{(\mathrm{ln}c)^{}(z,x)(\mathrm{ln}c)^{}(z,y)}{xy}},`$
$`h_4(x,y,z)`$ $`:=`$ $`z(\mathrm{ln}c)^{}(z,x)(\mathrm{ln}c)^{}(z,y),`$
$`h`$ $`:=`$ $`h_1{\displaystyle \frac{1}{2}}h_2+2h_3h_4.`$ (3.1)
The functions $`h_i`$ have no essential singularities if arguments coincide.

Note that $`A,B_\rho ^f:=Tr(Ac_f(L_\rho ,R_\rho )(B))`$ defines a riemannian metric also over $`𝒟_n`$ ($`𝒟_n^1`$ is a submanifold of codimension 1). Let $`\text{Scal}_f(\rho )`$ be the scalar curvature of $`(𝒟_n,,_\rho ^f)`$ at $`\rho `$ and $`\text{Scal}_f^1(\rho )`$ be the scalar curvature of $`(𝒟_n^1,,_\rho ^f)`$.

###### Theorem 3.5.

 Let $`\sigma (\rho )`$ be the spectrum of $`\rho `$. Then

$$\text{Scal}_f(\rho )=\underset{x,y,z\sigma (\rho )}{}h(x,y,z)\underset{x\sigma (\rho )}{}h(x,x,x)$$
(3.2)
$$\text{Scal}_f^1(\rho )=\text{Scal}_f(\rho )+\frac{1}{4}(n^21)(n^22).$$

## 4 Wigner-Yanase information as a riemannian metric

Let $`\rho 𝒟_n^1`$ be a density matrix and let $`A`$ be a self adjoint matrix. The Wigner-Yanase information (or skew information, information content relative to $`A`$) was defined as

$$I(\rho ,A):=\text{Tr}([\rho ^{1/2},A]^2)$$

where $`[,]`$ denotes the commutator(see ). Consider now $`g(x):=g_{\text{wy}}(x):=4(1\sqrt{x})`$. In this case

$$H_g(\rho ,\sigma )=4(1\text{Tr}(\rho ^{\frac{1}{2}}\sigma ^{\frac{1}{2}})).$$

The associated operator monotone and Chentsov-Morotzova functions are

$$f_{\text{wy}}(x):=\frac{1}{4}(\sqrt{x}+1)^2c_{\text{wy}}(x,y):=\frac{1}{yf_{\text{wy}}(\frac{x}{y})}=\frac{4}{(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y})^2}$$

Let us consider the monotone metric

$$A,B_\rho ^{\text{wy}}:=\text{Tr}(Ac_{\text{wy}}(L_\rho ,R_\rho )(B)).$$

A typical element of $`(T_\rho D_n)^o`$ has the form $`\mathrm{i}[\rho ,A]`$, where $`A`$ is self-adjoint. We have

$`\mathrm{i}[\rho ,A],\mathrm{i}[\rho ,A]_\rho ^{\text{wy}}`$ $`=\text{Tr }\left(\mathrm{i}[\rho ,A]4(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^2(\mathrm{i}[\rho ,A])\right)`$
$`=4\text{Tr }\left((L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1([\rho ,A])(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1([\rho ,A])\right)`$
$`=4\text{Tr }\left((L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1(L_\rho R_\rho )(A)(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1(L_\rho R_\rho )(A)\right)`$
$`=4\text{Tr }\left((L_\rho ^{1/2}R_\rho ^{1/2})(A)(L_\rho ^{1/2}R_\rho ^{1/2})(A)\right)`$
$`=4\text{Tr}\left([\rho ^{1/2},A]^2\right)=4I(\rho ,A)`$
and this explains why the monotone metric associated with the function $`\frac{1}{4}(\sqrt{x}+1)^2`$ is called the Wigner-Yanase monotone metric.

## 5 The main result

First of all we calculate the scalar curvature of Wigner-Yanase information using Theorem 3.5. If $`f_{\text{wy}}(x):=\frac{1}{4}(\sqrt{x}+1)^2`$ we write $`\text{Scal}_{\text{wy}}^1`$ for $`\text{Scal}_f^1`$.

###### Theorem 5.1.

$$\text{Scal}_{\text{wy}}^1(\rho )=\frac{1}{4}(n^21)(n^22).$$

###### Proof.

Let us calculate the auxiliary functions for $`c_{\text{wy}}(x,y):=4(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y})^2`$. We get

$`h_1(x,y,z)`$ $`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{\sqrt{x}\sqrt{y}+3\sqrt{x}\sqrt{z}+3\sqrt{y}\sqrt{z}+z}{4\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y}\right)^2\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{z}\right)\left(\sqrt{y}+\sqrt{z}\right)}}`$
$`h_2(x,y,z)`$ $`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y}+2\sqrt{z}\right)^2}{4\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{z}\right)^2\left(\sqrt{y}+\sqrt{z}\right)^2}}`$
$`h_3(x,y,z)`$ $`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{\sqrt{z}}{\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y}\right)\left(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{z}\right)\left(\sqrt{y}+\sqrt{z}\right)}}`$
$`h_4(x,y,z)`$ $`=`$ $`{\displaystyle \frac{1}{(\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{z})(\sqrt{y}+\sqrt{z}).}}`$
Now one can verify by calculation that the symmetrization of $`h_1\frac{1}{2}h_2`$ and the symmetrization of $`2h_3h_4`$ vanish. Hence, by (3.1), the symmetrization of $`h`$ vanishes, too. Since we sum up in formula (3.2) over all triples of eigenvalues we may replace $`h`$ with its symmetrization without changing the summation result. Therefore

$$\text{Scal}_{\text{wy}}(\rho )=0,\text{Scal}_{\text{wy}}^1(\rho )=\frac{1}{4}(n^21)(n^22)\rho 𝒟_n^1.$$

In what follows we use the pull-back approach to derive (and explain) the above formula in a direct way. Furthermore we deduce the geodesic distance and geodesic equation.

Let us denote by $`𝒮`$ the manifold $`\{AM_n:\mathrm{Tr}AA^{}=2,A=A^{}\}`$. Clearly, since $`𝒮`$ is the intersection of the radius 2 sphere in $`^{n\times n}`$ and the subspace of Hermitian matrices, it is isometric with a radius 2 sphere $`S_2^{n^21}`$.

Now, let $`\phi :𝒟_n^1𝒮^{n\times n}`$, $`\phi (\rho ):=2\sqrt{\rho }`$. Then we have the following result (see ).

###### Theorem 5.2.

The pull-back by the map $`\phi `$ of the natural metric on $`𝒮S_2^{n^21}`$ coincides with the Wigner-Yanase monotone metric.

###### Proof.

Let $`A`$ and $`B`$ be vectors tangent to $`𝒟_n^1`$ at $`\rho `$. Because $`\phi (\rho )\phi (\rho )=4\rho `$ we get from the Leibniz rule $`D_\rho \phi (A)\sqrt{\rho }+\sqrt{\rho }D_\rho \phi (A)=2A`$ Thus, the differential of $`\phi `$ at the point $`\rho `$ is given by

$$D_\rho \phi (A)=2\left(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2}\right)^1(A).$$

Therefore the pull-back of the real part of the Hilbert-Schmidt metric yields

$`D_\rho \phi (\mathrm{Re},)(A,B)`$ $`=\mathrm{Re}D_\rho \phi (A),D_\rho \phi (B)`$
$`=4\mathrm{Re}(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1(A),(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^1(B)`$
$`=4A,(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^2(B)`$
$`=4\text{Tr}A(L_\rho ^{1/2}+R_\rho ^{1/2})^2(B)`$
$`=\text{Tr}Ac_{wy}(L_\rho ,R_\rho )(B)=A,B_\rho ^{\text{wy}}`$
which was to be proved. ∎

From this result one can deduce the following

###### Theorem 5.3.

For the geodesic distance, geodesic path and the scalar curvature of Wigner-Yanase information the following formulae hold

1) geodesic distance

$$d_{\text{wy}}(\rho ,\sigma )=2\text{arccos}(\text{Tr}(\rho ^{1/2}\sigma ^{1/2}))$$
(5.1)
2) geodesic path

$$\gamma _{\text{wy}}^{\rho ,\sigma }(t)=2\frac{((1t)\sqrt{\rho }+t\sqrt{\sigma })^2}{\text{Tr}(((1t)\sqrt{\rho }+t\sqrt{\sigma })^2)}$$
(5.2)
3) scalar curvature

$$\text{Scal}_{\text{wy}}^1(\rho )=\frac{1}{4}(n^21)(n^22).$$
(5.3)
###### Proof.

The formulae are immediate consequences of the preceding theorem and of sphere geometry. Indeed by the pull-back argument the Wigner-Yanase metric looks locally like a sphere of radius 2 of dimension $`(n^21)`$. But for a sphere of this kind the sectional curvatures are all equal to $`\frac{1}{4}`$ and therefore the scalar curvature is given by $`\frac{1}{4}(n^21)(n^22)`$. ∎

One may ask if other monotone metrics are the pull-back of some function $`\phi `$ different from the square root. The rest of the section answers this question.

###### Definition 5.4.

A monotone metric $`,_{\rho ,f}`$ is a pull-back metric if there exists a manifold $`𝒮M_n`$ and a function $`\phi 𝒞^1(0,+\mathrm{})`$ such that the pull-back metric of $`\phi :𝒟_n^1𝒮M_n`$ coincides with $`,_{\rho ,f}`$.

###### Proposition 5.5.

Let $`,_{\rho ,f}`$ be a monotone metric, let $`c=c_f`$ be the associated $`CM`$-function and let $`\phi 𝒞^1(0,+\mathrm{})`$. We have that $`,_{\rho ,f}`$ is a pull-back metric by $`\phi `$ if and only if

$$\left(\frac{\phi (x)\phi (y)}{xy}\right)^2=c(x,y).$$
(5.4)
###### Proof.

Apply the formula (3.3) to tangent vectors in $`(T_\rho 𝒟_n^1)^o`$. ∎

###### Definition 5.6.

Let $`\phi ,\chi 𝒞^1(0,+\mathrm{})`$. We say that $`(\phi ,\chi )`$ is a dual pair if there exist an operator monotone $`f`$ such that

$$\frac{\phi (x)\phi (y)}{xy}\frac{\chi (x)\chi (y)}{xy}=c(x,y).$$
(5.5)
where $`c=c_f`$ is the $`CM`$-function associated to $`f`$.

In such a case we say that $`f`$ (or $`c_f`$) is a dual function. If $`(\phi ,\phi )`$ is a dual pair with respect to $`f`$ (or $`c_f`$) we say that $`f`$ (or $`c_f`$) is self-dual. Obviously one has

###### Proposition 5.7.

To say that $`,_{\rho ,f}`$ is a pull-back metric by $`\phi `$ it is equivalent to say that $`f`$ (or $`c_f`$) is self-dual with respect to $`\phi `$.

###### Definition 5.8.

Two dual pairs $`(\phi ,\chi ),(\stackrel{~}{\phi },\stackrel{~}{\chi })`$ are equivalent if there exist constants $`A_1,A_2,B_1,B_2`$ such that $`A_1A_2=1`$

$`\stackrel{~}{\phi }`$ $`=A_1\phi +B_1`$
$`\stackrel{~}{\chi }`$ $`=A_2\chi +B_2.`$
Obviously equivalent pairs define the same $`CM`$-function. In what follows we consider dual pairs up to this equivalence relation with the traditional abuse of language. We are ready to state the fundamental result of the theory that classifies dual pairs.

###### Theorem 5.9.

() Let $`\phi ,\chi 𝒞^1(0,+\mathrm{})`$. Then $`(\phi ,\chi )`$ is a dual pair if and only if one of the following two possibilities hold

$$(\phi (x),\chi (x))=(\frac{x^p}{p},\frac{x^{1p}}{1p})p[1,2]\{0,1\}$$

$$(\phi (x),\chi (x))=(x,\text{log}(x)).$$

###### Corollary 5.10.

The function $`f(x)=\frac{1}{4}(\sqrt{x}+1)^2`$ is the only self-dual operator monotone function, that is: the Wigner-Yanase metric is the only pull-back metric among statistically monotone metrics.

## 6 Conclusions

###### Remark 6.1.

Note that the formula (5.1) implies $`d^{\text{wy}}(\rho ,\sigma )2\pi `$. An analogous inequality holds for the Bures metric (see , p.311). It seems that in the literature there are no other explicit formulas for the geodesics distance. For example it is known that the formula

$$d_\text{b}(\rho ,\sigma )=\sqrt{22\text{Tr}(\rho ^{\frac{1}{2}}\sigma \rho ^{\frac{1}{2}})^{\frac{1}{2}}}$$
(6.1)
defines a metric on the state space whose infinitesimal counterpart (say the hessian) is the $`SLD`$-metric (that is $`f(x)=\frac{1}{2}(1+x)`$). But this does not imply that Equation (6.1) is the geodesic distance of the $`SLD`$-metric.

###### Remark 6.2.

In general it is difficult to give explicit formulae for geodesic paths of monotone metrics. In the case of the Bures metric these geodesics can be given because they are projections of large circles on a sphere in the purifying space (see  p.311 and ). For a discussion of geodesics for $`\alpha `$-connections see .

###### Remark 6.3.

A classical theorem classifies the spaces of costant curvature . It is not known at the moment if there are other monotone metrics of costant sectional and scalar curvature.

###### Remark 6.4.

We have seen in the commutative case that for the Levi-Civita connection of the pull-back of the square root it is available the decomposition

$$^2=\frac{1}{2}(^m+^e).$$

In the non-commutative case an analogous decomposition for the pull-back of the square root no longer holds. Indeed, on one hand, the use of Umegaki relative entropy $`H(\rho ,\sigma )=\text{Tr}(\rho (\mathrm{log}\rho \mathrm{log}\sigma ))`$ produces a similar decomposition, but for the Bogoliubov-Kubo-Mori metric . On the other hand, if one uses $`H_{\text{wy}}(\rho ,\sigma )=4(1\text{Tr}(\rho ^{1/2}\sigma ^{1/2}))`$ as a divergence on $`𝒟_n^1`$ and constructs the associated dualistic structure $`(,^{H_{\text{wy}}},^{H_{\text{wy}}},^{H_{\text{wy}}})`$ (again following the lines of ), then the construction is trivial, namely the dual connections both coincide with the Levi-Civita connection of the Wigner-Yanase information. This is easily seen on $`𝒫_n`$ where $`H_g(\rho ,\sigma )`$ reduces to Csiszar relative $`g`$-entropy: it is known that such an entropy induces the $`\alpha `$-geometry where $`\alpha `$ is given by the formula $`\alpha =3+2g^{\prime \prime \prime }(1)/g^{\prime \prime }(1)`$ (see  p.57). For $`g=4(1\sqrt{x})`$ this gives $`\alpha =0`$ that is the Fisher information case (see also ).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has been supported by the italian MIUR program ”Quantum Probability and Infinite Dimensional Analysis” 2001-2002. It is a pleasure to thank J. Dittmann for a number of valuable conversations on this subject and for permitting us to reproduce in this paper the proof of Theorem 5.1.